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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NAMIBIA: From Terminal 
Decay Toward Independent Reconstruction
By Reginald Herbold Green
...fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star...
Shape without form, shade without colour 
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;...
What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow 
Out of this stony rubbish?
- T. 3. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men'/ 
'Gerontion'
If South Africa is ready to hand over power,
SWAPO is ready... We have been fighting 
for Namibia and we are ready to rule it.
- President Sam Mujoma, 1986
Now it the time 
To seine the future 
Which belongs 
To all people.
- Augustine Neto
I. Namibia's Economy: Downward Spiral to Recovery 
A Wasted Land: Anc Its Transformation
The territorial economy of Namibia has since the late 1970s" steadily
deteriorated and is now one of the weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
colonial política1 economy has disintegrated from one of profitable (for South
Africa, settlers and TNCs) exp loitation at ' acceota'ole' costs of repression z o
a bottomless well. of red L UK for South Africa, a debt ridden, disintegrating
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levels of repression (perhaps 100,000 'security' forces to hold down 1,500,000
Namibians) and increasingly frenetic attempts to buy some fragments of
Namibian acquiescence.
Humpty Dumpty clearly cannot be put back together again. Even South Africa 
and her various circus acts (such as the current so-called 'Transitional 
Government of National Unity' - a typical example of South African
"doublespeak1’ since it is neither a government, national nor unified even 
among its members) see no alternative to an independent, internationally 
recognised Namibia and the sooner the better from an economic point of view. 
The bottom line is government by whom, for whom, accountable to whom - 
questions to which SWAPO on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the people 
of Namibia as well as the National Council of Churches in Namibia (30% or more 
of Namibians are practising Christians) give very different answers from South 
Africa, the settlers and their black camp followers (not that South Africa, 
the settlers and the camp followers are in full agreement with each other).
Major companies have of late tended to a discrete public silence punctuated by 
ambiguous hints presumably intended to placate SWAPQ, South Africa and the
settlers (a manifestly hopeless endeavour) in order to ensure their future 
against all eventualities. While most probably would like to see the status 
quo ex ante of the late 1970s restored, the more perceptive are well aware 
that it is impossible and the actual status quo of uncertainty and strife is 
not - except in the very snort run - seen as in their interests. Nor do they 
show much enthusiasm for any alternative even nominally in sight: South
Africa's fiscal policy of buying guns and backers threatens both higher taxes 
and continued war; the settler bitterness at the major companies (particularly 
Anglo/De Beers whom they suspect - quite correctly - of viewing its cwn 
survival in Namibia, notably that of Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb, as 
of primary concern and settler interests as of tertiary importance) is 
arguably greater than that of SWAPO; SWAPO ' 3 commitment to democracy, to 
development oriented to the basic needs of Namibians and to transition to 
socialism (despite living with independent, progressive governments in Angloa, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe) is seen as sure to require major changes ana major 
after tax orofit reductions.
The purpose of this paper is not to analyse the economy or political economy 
of Namibia now or at independence in detail. That has been done by UNIN in
its forthcoming Namibia: Perspectives for Nacional Reconstruction and
Development:J and inter alia by the present author and Caroline Allison in 
Political Economy and Structural Change: Namibia at Independence." Nor is it 
to review South Africa's ,Ttotal strategy" in respect to Namibia which is done 
from a South African perspective in Deon Geldenhuys1 The Diplomacy of 
Isolation3 and from a Southern African Liberation perspective in David Martin 
and Phyllis Johnson's Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa At War."1
Rather it is intended:
a. to sketch the 1977-35 disintegration of the economy and the political 
economy; and
'o. to underline certain key requirements for reconstruction and
transformation at independence.
Similarly the proposals made in this paper do not - unlike these of the first 
two works cited above - constitute an economic or political economic strategy 
for independent Namibia. Rather they are intended:
a. to relate to practical measures concerned outsiders can take new to
assist Namibians in preparing themselves for undertaking economic
reconstruction and transformation ac independence and in that context to
stress;
o. personpower (human resource), institutional and knowledge base
develooment.
Economic Decline '977-1934
In 1977 considered purely from a territorial, sectler and/or enterprise point 
of view Namibia's economy was relatively satisfactory with an output of the 
order of $300 per capita, a positiv crade (including non-factor payment 
invisibles) balance, a recurrent oudget surplus, a d iversified mineral sector 
with a major addition (Rossing Uranium) about to come on stream, a financially 
viable and apparently technically socale white ranching industry, some signs 
of recovery in the overcatch damaged fishing industry and an historic real
output growth rata of the order oí 5?* .he political economy of exploitaation 
and of inequality (or mere bluntly of theft) was stark and clear but for its 
masters the Namibian economy paid.
3y 19 8 5 output per capita was of the order of $600 in 1985 and $240-250 in
1977 prices.1 The external trade balance had swung into serious deficit as
had the recurrent budget while drought and war had sent the white ranching 
sector reeling to under half its 1977 real output and renewed overcatching had 
further eroded and threatened to wipe out the fishing sector. Base metals had 
not recovered from the slump which began in the mid-1970s and diamonds had 
gone into deep depression (with a 50? cut in Namibian output) and Rossing 
Uranium while contributing about 10* of C-D? had also fallen on relatively hard 
times. The physical growth trend from 1977 on was about minus 1.5? a year 
(minus nearly 5? a year on a per capita basis) with no recovery in sight and 
even bottoming out by no means assured. The per capita output fall in
constant price rand terms of about 33? understated the impact because of the 
marked negative terms of trade swings. The fall in constant price dollar 
terms of about 70? probably overstates as the rand was arguably overvalued in 
1977 and fairly clearly undervalued in 1985. But given the massive influence 
of terms of trade swings in a territorial economy in which about 90? of
physical goods produced are exported and 35? odd of physical goods used 
imported plus the very large increase in 'security' and administrative 
expenditure which was worse than nugatory in value to the majority of
Namibians, a 50? fall in per capita territorial command over real resources
3over 1 9 7 7 - 8 5  is a reasonable estimate.
The causal factors are clear enough:
1 . the general impact of the post 1973 global recession on 33A economies in
general and of the post 1975 mineral recession en 33A mining economies in
particular;
2 . the impact of a seven year 19 7 7 .5 11 drought on a ranching sector already
at stocking and pasture utilisation levels probably beyond prudent
estimates of ecological capacity;
the ¡rica of sustained plundering - rather than harvesting of - fish and
crustacean stocxs;
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4. the direct and indirect costa of the war to hold off the Namibian 
people's struggle for national rehabilitation;
5. dependent integration into the relative!'/ stagnant (albeit not actively 
declining) economy of South Africa;
6. gross fiscal and economic mis-management, largely but not wholly related 
to desparata attempts to create and f buy up’ a black middle class elite 
to give credibility to South Africa's attempt to create a 'federated 
oanstutans' type of ' independence' behind a white government (and 
economy) with black shopwindow faces.
More detailed presentations of the lasc year for which relatively complete and
Q'final' data have been pieced together appear in Annex 1.'
The Political Economy of Exploitation and Inequality
While taken as a territorial unit Namibia no longer 'pays' its masters in 
direct economic terms and indeed represents a drain of up to $6C0 million a 
year on the South African economy after offsetting private sector profits and 
remittances, this has not been the result of lessened exploitation cr any 
serious attempt to reduce inquality or absolute poverty. Rather it has been 
the result of territorial economic decline and of war.
Namibia's territorial budgets (outlined on a consolidated oasis in Annex 1) 
have ballooned since 197” . However, while there has been substantial 
expansion in the quantity (not quality) of black education and of black 
functionaries, the main causes have net been deveiooemental but pare of the 
politics of continued repression and facade creation.
Much of the increase relates co police and military bills transferred frcm the 
South African budges (and steadily increasing over time). Other transferred 
items include external debes incurred by SATS (South African Transport 
Services) and ZSCGM (Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa), 
assertedly in respect :o oneir Namibian operations and to operating deficits 
incurred by the oversea: led, i_l (cr at any rate non-economicaluy) managed
ff
Namibian fragments of SATS and similar items 'devolved' to the pseudo Namibian
administration.11 The largest single element relates to wage and salary
increases to hold white employees and to create a black elite. The bulk of
the balance relates to servicing of so-called 'external' (dominantly in South
12African financial institution portfolios ~ )  'debt', illegally incurred by the 
Administrator General because South Africa was unwilling to finance the full 
gap between the territorial expenses required to sustain its policies in 
Namibia and the eroding real yield of the revenue base hit by economic - and 
especially mining profit - decline.
Historically Namibia has had one of the lowest gross national to gross 
domestic product ratios in the world because of the very large proportion of 
corporate profits in territorial product (see Annex 1). While this drain has 
declined as a share of gross output since 1977 the reason has nothing to do 
with any change in state or enterprise political economic orientation. Rather 
it results from falling profits leading to reduced profit transfers (and even 
sharper falls in enterprise gross fixed capital formation - see Annex 1).
Household income distribution in Namibia is probably the most unequal in the 
world. ' In 1977 average white household income was of the order of R 11*100 
and black of R 600 for a ratio of the order of 1S . 5 to 1. As of 1983 the 
position was R 20,875 white versus R 1,300 black for a ratio of about 11.5 to
The cause of the decline is integral to South African divide and rule tactics. 
In 1977 white households (45,000) received about 71® of household income, 
black elite households (then perhaps 20 to 25,000) 7$ and black worker and 
peasant households (230 to 235,000) 22$. In 1983 the shares were white
(40,000) 53% ,  black elite (oC,CC0) 21$, black worker and peasant (310,000)
21$. (See Annex 1.)
The black elite has been created partly as a result of large employers 
realising that higher real wages were prudent for economic efficiency and 
future survial and, more particularly, government attempts to create a black 
middle class and to buy its loyalty against the liberation movement. The 
black elite while receiving oncer a third of white income per household 
receives on the order O; o '-..nes -nac of the average black worker and peasant 
household. For the matter tne disparity with white household incomes has
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remained at about 20 to 1 and indeed average real purchasing power has 
declined over 1977-35 as a result of general economic decline, drought, war 
and repression. 3y 1985 absolute poverty probably had risen to about 55-70$ 
and open and disguised unemployment to the order of UG$ (see Annexes 1 and 2).
The attempt to create and to buy a black elite has not worked well for South 
Africa. It has created a budget deficit, but the loyalty of the genuinely 
skilled or professional members of the elite has certainly not been bought.
That of the non-functioning members of multiple administrations and their 
homeguards and of the myriad pro-administration politic! leaders without
followers probably has, but to what point is another matter.
However, for independent Namibia the results of the policy will pose real 
problems. The wages of semi-skilled and skilled black mine (and some other 
large employer - e.g. banks) workers and of nurses, teachers, secretaries and 
technicians are objectively too high in relation to Namibia's per capita 
output to be consistent with universal access to basic services, developmental
expenditure oriented to raising productivity and incomes of the main body of
black worker and peasant households and of levels of net fixed capital 
formation adequate to restructure and expand output.
Some Implications for Reconstruction and Development
No significant recovery - let alone transformation or structural adjustment - 
can be expected in the Namibian economy before independence. The cost of the 
war and the 'buy a bantustan' policies, the uncertainties preventing long term
investment by settlers and companies and the longer term impact of the
drought, the destruction of the fisheries and the prolonged world mineral
market depression guarantee that. In any event, while such a recovery could 
increase the productive resource and import capacity foundations of the
economy and perhaps redress the shambles to which reckless mismanagement and 
the shoring up of apartheid has reduced public finances it could narcly be 
expected to have any significant positive impact on the political economy ox 
exploitation and insitutlocalised inequality.
The most reasonable assumption is that the economic and political economic 
characteristics sketched m  the previous sections will pertain at independence
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and will be exacerbated by the exodus or settler and South African human
resources, institutional capacities and financial resources - as witnessed in 
other settler colonies in the run up to, at, and in the first years after
1 uindependence whatever the policies of the independent states. *t From this a 
series of implications as to priorities at independence flow:
1. the rehabilitation of agriculture - including shifts of output toward 
food and domestically needed raw materials, of structure toward small 
peasant farms and worker self management or co-operative ranches - is 
essential in terms of rural incomes and employment, national food 
security, development of non-agricultural sectors and averting 
unmanageable tidal waves of migration to urban areas;
2. the stabilisation of the mining sector (in production terms) and its
integration within a Namibian policy context is equally essential in 
respect to public finance and export earnings as is the revival of 
prospecting, proving and development to halt the ongoing erosion of the 
base metals sub-sector’s output and reserves;
3- the maintenance of critical existing public services and utilities (e.g.
water, power, agricultural extension and support, transport, posts and 
telecommunications, education and health) needs to be combined with 
re-orientation toward Namibian development including broadening access to 
and raising quality of basic services (including health, education, water 
and productive sector extension), cutting back on high cost/limited
a r, . . . 1 o ....................................  . „ . . .access elite services and reducing the levels of waste now existing in
public expenditures.
4. reducing both absolute poverty - now affecting up to two thirds of all
households - and inequality of household incomes (especially racial but 
also intra ,- black) which is among the highest in the world (exceeding 
that of South Africa itself) as preconditions for human welfare, for
building up capacity to work more productively and for any viable social
and political rabric;
5. increasing the human resource base of Namibia and of Namibians in respect 
to skills, institutional capacity and knowledge to provide a less 
dependent, more reliable, less costly and more stable base for
- 9 -
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reconstruction and development than the present very heavy dependence on 
settlers, expatriates, externally based enterprises and foreign (at 
present South African) governmental agencies.
The detailing of requirements flowing from these implications at independence
18is beyond the intended scope of this paper. The recommendations which
follow focus on how Namibian capacity to cope with them at independence can be 
enhanced by external cooperation now and throughout the remaining - rather 
indeterminate - period before independence.
II. Some Practical Proposals For Today 
The Pre-Independence Context
To predict the cate of Namibia's independence would be rash. Any oarticular 
year from 198? through 2000 can be argued to be least plausible and at least 
unlikely. One objective of 3WAP0 and its cooperating partners is to alter the 
contexts in which South Africa acts in Namibia and abroad to bring the 
probable date closer. That is one area - perhaps the most important area - 
for immediate action but one dealt with by other papers and presentations.
On independence Namibia will - as a result of colonial and occupation rule and
the struggles to maintain and to overcome it, as well as of the impact of the
1979-193? global economic and African ecological crises and of the limitations 
of what physical and output development was achieved - require substantial
initial external assistance. Certain skills - embodied in high and middle
level personpower, project finance for rehabilitation and transformation,
programme assistance to meet transitional external balance, fiscal source, 
physical supply and external reserve proolems inherited from South Africa; 
institutional competence and experience in a number of sectors and locations 
(i.e. externally as well as in Namibia) will be required urgently and the 
longer the lag, the greater the costs of transition for Namibians and the
larger the cooperation requests Namibia will need to make of its friends,
jntil the timing of independence is clearer, mere work can be cone on the
spot, micro data is mere available, drawing up the details (or even the 
ballpark scale and breakdown) of these needs is literally impossible. Even if 
they were to be drawn up, major programmes in Namibia cannot be implemented
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before independence. ?re independence aid agreements with the South African 
occupation authorities or their client 'governments' and agents in Namibia 
cannot not constitute a head start toward economic rehabilitation and 
transformation; rather they can only delay independence and raise the ultimate 
human costs to Namibia's and the economic obstacles confronting these
responsible for rehabilitation, reconstruction and transformation upon
. , 19independence.
The areas in which immediate acción by cooperating partners with the people of 
Namibia are both practicable and urgent today include:
1. personpower development directly related to Namibian requirements and 
presently forecast availabilities at independence;
2. more general educational expansion, e.g. distance learning, English, 
primary-secondary-vocational education in SWAPO's eduationai system;
3. institutional capacity development in key areas for which either no 
present Namibian institution exists (e.g. central bank) or in which 
present institutional capacity would be likely to exit with South Africa 
(e.g. perhaps electricity and railways);
4. knowledge development, e.g. harbour development, agriculture, ecological 
damage control in respect to mines;
5. immediate survival and learning needs of Namibians in Namibia.
Responding to Namibian requests and formulating programmmes with and for 
representative Namibian bodies is needed - freehand institution of a melange 
of purely 'donor designed' initiatives - let alone ones in collaboration with 
the occupation regime and its camp followers - is not. Practically this 
implies:
1. government and official intergovernmental or international assistance
should be designed in collaboration with and channelled through SWAPO 
and/or the United Nations Council for Namibia's Nationhood Programme;
ar.c should be based on inquiries as to what is seen as of top priority by
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3WAP0, not on donor guesses or random programme developer preferences;
voluntary organisations - especially church connected ones - may find it 
practicable to relate to the programmes of the National Council of 
Churches in Namibia (basically Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic and
Methodist) and its member churches as well as to SWAPO and the Nationhood
Programme;
and the NCCN and. its members appear to be virtually the only plausible 
channels for Namibian liberation oriented development activity in 
occupied Namibia now or in the foreseeable future;
so that if governments and official agencies feel a need to provide 
programming for Namibians in occupied Namibia, the channel lease likely 
to be manipulated by the South African occupation regime and its 
collaborators is via northern ngo's which develop support for NCCN and 
member programmes;
the changing kaleidoscopic nature of collaboratoinist entities, the 
limited information avaiiaoie to most ngo's and agencies on Namibia, the 
desirability of Namibian coordination of support and the need to avoid 
arousing suspicion on the part of Namibians committed to liberación in
the context of the ongoing wartime situation strongly counsel discussing
all proposed projects, programmes and cooperating partners in Namibia 
with SWAPO and the NCCN before detailed indentification design,
PQnegotiation and implementation.~
come examples
Personpower development in respect co Namibia is not a cabula rasa on which 
any input a donor wishes to put down will be as useful as any other. A 
substantial body of data on occupations, skills and supplies/requirements 
exists (see Annex 2). Even if it is necessarily somewhat imprecise it has 
provided SWAPO's education secretariat with a basis to begin checking the 
priorities and levels of its training programmes with a view to gap filling. 
Substantial work in providing assistance in meeting training needs has been 
provided by UN agencies, che Commonwealth Secretariat and a number of
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governments with very partial coordination and prioritisation via the 
Nationhood Programme.
What is most urgently needed now are discussions with the SWAPO education 
secretariat and/or the officials of the Office of the UN Commissioner for 
Namibia administering the Nationhood Programme to identify priority skills and 
skill levels in which existing training places and flows are clearly very 
inadequate. Examples appear to include, inter alia, mining engineers, 
geologists, veterinarians, agronomists, auditors and accountants, electrical 
engineers, hydrologists and - in most of these fields - middle level 
technicians and oara professionals.
certain specialised educational programmes overlap personpower development and 
institutional capacity buildup. Examples include distance education (in which 
SWAPO and UNIN have built up a significant programme), English language 
teaching to make the national language designate more widely accessible and 
useable (on which SWAPO and the Commonwealth Secretariat have carried out 
substantial preliminary research and exploration toward programme design), 
textbook development (also begun by SWAPO and UNIN) and retraining and 
upgrading courses for existing teachers (a massive problem at independence 
requiring early attention then - preferably without suspending the educational 
system while it is done following course and trainer development now).
Institutional capacity development requires and allows for more than 
identifying needs and potentials and setting down, more or less elaborated 
models on paper - useful as that may be as a start (an endeavour begun in the 
UNIN study). Further steps - following joint identification with SWAPO of 
priority areas in which the wculd-be cccoerating partner has competence 
could include:
1. studying ar.aiagous institutions in relatively similar contexts (e.g. 
veterinary services in Botswana, rural health programmes/structures in 
Zimbabwe and/or Tanzania, base metal smelting and refining in Zambia) and 
from these working out first approximation designs for Namibian use;
2. using these findings in connection with training programme priority 
development and - where feasible - identifying Namibians for in-service 
as we ml as z orna_ -raining for xey positions;
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3. when a probable independence data is more readily discernible setting up
'shadow' institutions - with if SWAPO desires seme expatriate training
and operational personnel - to work themselves toward initial operation 
21takeover;
4. in cases in which key expatriate personnel are likely co be required to
replace departing South Africans and in which even snort term personnel
gaps could be disastrous (e.g. the Ruacana Falls hydro and Windhoek and
Walvis Say thermal stations which supply the bulk of Namibia's
electricity) identifying and agreeing to provide personnel if and when
22needed and taking steps to be able to act promptly on that commitment.”
A survey of key institutional requirements is provided in the UNIN study. One 
very obvious example - on which seme preliminary work has been done for SWAPO 
- is a central bank. An institutional capacity related area is economic 
legislation - both as to design and as to drafting. Much of the occupied 
territory's existing economic legislation is archaic, ill adapted to a 
developing country, non-existent (because South African institutions and 
legislation apply) and/or integrally tainted by the incorporation of 
apartheid. Evidently new legislation cannot be adopted until after a Namibian 
body to enact it exists but the identification and drafting of bills for laws 
should start new in order for bills to be available for the legislative to 
consider, amend, adopt. A substantial body of relevant economic and legal 
experience exists and SWAPO is known to be concerned with modalities for 
avoiding a legal vacuum following removal of South African and apartheid 
tainted territorial legislation and decrees. Discussion toward providing 
applied economic, legal, and drafting technical assistance to Namibia through 
SWAPO (directly or via UNIN) would appear to be an important general 
institutional development agenda item.
In all institutional capacity development work a key - but often overlooked - 
point is to involve Namibians in the exercise. That will develop their 
capacity to go on to do applied rsearch themselves and/cr to run the new 
institutions.
Inadequate knowledge has seen at the root of many failed development eiiorts - 
not only in S u o —Sanaran Airica. in Namioia the problem is par-icuiar_^ scu^e
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especially because official information (on vehicle registration or
agricultural research or railway rolling stock as well as on makeup of imports
and energy consumption) is either not readily available (least of all to
Namibians committed to the liberation of their country) or is actively
concealed/restricted. Further, field research and micro data collection are 
in many cases quite impossible to carry out except on the spot - a Catch 22 
precondition in respect to Namibia today.
However, more knowledge exists than is generally realised - or catalogued and
summarised in an accessible form. The UNIN study and Tore Linne Eriksen's
22annotated bibliography The Political Economy of Namibia""' both represent 
important steps toward identifying, making accessible and synthesizing what is 
known and giving indications of what additional knowledge is urgently needed.
A brief paper does noc allow anything like a ccmplece enumeration of areas, 
nor are all practicable prior to independence (or a transitional 
administration) allowing on the spot access. However, a number of examples 
can be ciced:
1 . desk and archive based studies of port potential and coses at Swakopmund, 
the mouth of the Swakop River (oddly not the same place by some miles and 
a hill) and Luderitz, since in the medium term waivis Bay is not a 
satisfactory port and in the short severe operationality problems may 
arise;
2. agricultural research drawing on surveys of Namibians in exile, studies 
of comparable zones in Botswana and Angola and applied field testing 
(linked to production enhancement) among the rural Namibian refugee 
communities in Angola and Zambia;
3. desk, available Namibian daca and comparable case research on mining 
health and environmental pollution and ways to minimise them with special 
reference co sulphur emissions at the Tsumeb smelter and dust/radiation 
pollution (direct contact, downwind air borne flows, watertable
3 ilcontamination) at Rossmg“ ;
4. systematic development of available food and morbidity/mortality daca 
into a form providing inputs into nutrición, agricultural development and
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specific (e.g. expanded immunisation programme) health programme 
components.
Immediate needs of Namibians in occupied Namibia - as noted - may in cart be 
met by assisting the NCCN and its members. The Welfare (Jnit of the Council 
has a substantial drought relief food programme. The Lutheran, Anglican and 
African Methodist Episcopal Churches have supplementary feeding programmes for 
children in kindergartens they support and the Methodist Church a child 
feeding scheme in SCatatura (literally "the place we do not wish to be" - the 
olack 'location' of Windhoek).- In addition a number of literacy, English 
language, vocational and adult education, basic health, craft, self help, 
farming and co-operative projects are sponsored by the NCCN, its member 
churches and associated Christian action groups. In seme cases these receive 
support from external church organisations. Most as the NCCN has stated 
require mere resources to develop into less crisis oriented or pilot project 
orientations.
Conclusion
The proposals above do not amount either to a strategy for the economic 
reconstruction of Namibia nor do they cover all the areas of cooperation
relevant today (e.g. political, diplomatic, continued support for UNIN, the UN 
Commissioner for Namibia's Office and the Nationhood Programme as well as
ongoing SWAPO programmes are not covered because they are the topic of other 
papers and presentations). What they do seek to do is to identify:
1 . how action today can assist Namibians in enhancing their capacity to
rebuild and develop their country on independence;
2. some ways of cooperating with Namibians in taking such action; and
3. a number of the readily identifiable areas in which exploring with SWAPO
(and/or the Nationhood Programme, UNIN and/or the NCCN) as to possible
programme and project support deserve early attention.
- a -
Notes
1. Professor Green has been a student of the political economy of Namibia 
since 1975. Although he is from time to time a consultant or advisor to 
the United Nations Institute for Namibia, SWAPO and the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference, the analysis and suggestions of this 
article are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of 
SWAPO, SADCC or UNIN.
2. UNIN, 1986 - in press.
3. IDS (Sussex), Discussion Paper 212, 1936, available at this Conference.
4. South African Institute of International Affairs/Macmillan, Johannesburg,
1985.
5- Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986 (June) - see especially Peter
Manning and R. H. Green, "Namibia: South Africa's ’Total Strategy' for 
Domination and Exploitation11.
5. For more detailed analysis see R. H. Green, M-L. Sil junen and S.
Kiljunen, Namibia: The Last Colony, Longman, Harlow, 19 8 1 especially
Chapter 3 and Statistical Anex.
7. Projected from 1977-33 estimates in Annex 1 on the basis of preliminary
official estimates for 1984 and rough guesstimates for 1935 which 
probably showed continued marginal fails in overall real output.
3. Data problems in Namibia are severe. This is in large measure a general
3SA problem with weak sources and weaker statistical units. In Namibia 
it is compounded by overt coverage exclusions notably of Walvis Bay which 
South Africa purports to be part of the Cape Province and of peasant - 
and other - household production for own use (i.e. the subsistence sector 
in standard national accounting terminology). The Annex 1 Tables are 
adjusted for these factors as far as is possible.
9. For a more detailed macro and sectoral analysis sse UNIN, oc cit and for
a series of annual snapshots of economic regressionn see the Namibia 
chapters of Africa Contemporary Record 1975-77 to date.
10. Fcr fuller discussion see UNIN, op cit.
11. For example, the 1985/36 South African budgetary transfer to Namibia rose 
by R 169.5 million from 1934/85's R 306.6 million to R 476.5 million. 
But of this R 125.3 million related to transfers of South African police, 
railway deficit and external debt costs to Namibia. The remaining R 42.7 
million was 13*9% in nominal, and probably negative in real, terms. 
(Data in Windhoek Advertiser 18-111-86.)
-o-
12. For 1985-36 even the South African regime's front government in Namibia
admitted that of R 31 million borrowed R 53 million had been long or
medium term from South African financial institutions and R 23 million
from a territorial bank overdraft facility with none external to RSA. 
(Statement by 'Finance Minister' Dirk Mudge reported in Windhoek 
Advertiser 17-11-36.)
13* cor fuller analysis see Green, Kil junen and Kiljunen, op cit, ACR
1984-35; UNIN, oo cit. "
14. For example in Zimbabwe - despite an economic climate which has on the
whole been consistent with their continued prosperity and a near total
absence of reprisals or discrimination - the number of residents of
European ancestry is now at a level of about 100,000 in contrast to a 
peak of 250,000 under the illegal regime in the late 1970s. The large 
number of South African expatriates in the Namibian white community (of 
the order of 40%) may well occasion an even more rapid exodus. The 
experience of non-settler colonies which came to independence by oeaceful 
transition with basically small, high skill, specialist expatriate and 
resident communities which subsequently combined a high turnover (in
individuals and lines of activity) with relatively stable - or even 
growing - size is much less likely to be relevant in the Namibian context 
than is that of Zimbabwe. This is particularly true because meeting 
basic human and developmental needs for the majority of Namibians, 
removing institutionalised racial inequality of incomes and preservation 
of present white average standards cannot all be achieved within the 
resource constraints impinging on independent Namibia. It would be 
whimsical - as well as against 5WAP0 policy - to give the last priority 
over the first two and very surprising if a majority of even relatively 
unprejudiced white residents were willing to accept substantial and 
potentially recurrent declines in their income standards. As Zimbabwe 
experience suggests, relatively young professionals, managers and 
technical civil servants in globally scarce fields are the most able and 
likely to leave.
15* For. a mere systematic and analytical presentation, see Allison and Green,
op cit and for one containing a rather taxonomic articulation of items 
within priorites, see UNIN, op cit.
16. This is practicable in Namibia in a way in which it was noc in 
non-settler colonies oecause of the very high proportion of spending 
directed to the white community.
17. The causes include the multiple and incompetent parallel administrations 
and services required by 'separase development' (Namibia may not rival 
South Africa's 19 different departments of education but has at lease a 
dozen and - indeed - was the model and laboratory for the South African 
'development'!) as well as posts and pay scales designed to buy 
allegiance (usually unsuccessfully) with little regard for performance or 
fiscal prudence, the 'security' ccscs inherent in occupation regimes with 
or without puppet facades and more standard maladministration and 
corruption. Ironically che regime's Thirion Commission of Inquiry has 
made tnese points even more caustzcally albeit from a c 
political perspective.
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18. For a much fuller discussion, see Allison and Green ojo cib and
especially - UNIN, oo cib.
19* As SWAPO nade very plain in bhe context of bhe February 1986 Fronb Line
States/EEC Member States Foreign Minisberial meeting in Lusaka, 
pre-independence development aid agreements with present official 
entities in occupied Namibia necessarily amount to giving aid and 
credence to the illegal regime and its collaborators. However intended, 
they therefore increase the obscacles to and tend to delay progress
toward independence.
20. There are no easy solutions to the issue of how - if at all - Namibians 
in occupied Namibia can be assisted prior to independence (or an 
internationally supervised transitional period). SWAPO has a national
membership and organisational structure in Namibia but the degree and 
scope of repression it faces mean it cannot operate as either a 
governmental or a large scale unofficial development agency in occupied 
Namibia today. To some extent the National Council of Churches in 
Namibia and its member Churches, as well as associated Christian bodies, 
can - and do - undertake relief and developmental work in respect to 
food, agriculture, vocational training, literacy, adult education, 
English, mother and child care, health and informal sector co-operatives. 
It can hardly be contended - and is not contended by SWAPO - that these 
programmes are other than in support of the liberation of Namibians or 
that they do not respond to real needs. Real problems of capacity, 
logistics and profiles attracting undesired attention do, however, arise. 
There may well be other unofficial bodies of Namibians doing useful work. 
The problem of identification and of separating them from bodies created 
primarily to promote their leaders/founders and from collaborationist 
entities is, however, very difficult, especially from outside Namibia. 
Further two facts are as real as they are cruel: not very much
developmental work even at small group level is possible so long as the 
occupation regime remains in power and the quickest way to expand access 
to health and educational opportunities for Namibians in Namibia is to 
take action resulting in early independence.
21. 'Shadow' institutions are not a new idea. Several central bank creations 
- e.g. Botswana, Tanzania - in independent Africa have involved creating 
the core structures and staffing up to a year and a half prior to the 
actual operational date.
22. Normal posts need identification technical assistance procedures and time 
lags are clearly inappropriate to such cases. An emergency situation is 
virtually certain to exist and its gravity can be reduced now by
sketching in the parameters of key probable gaps and of sources and
timing of replacement pesonnei.
23. (With Richard Mocrsom), Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (in 
cooperation with United Nation's Institute for Namibia, Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs), Uppsala, 1 9 8 5 .
- d -
i  - *
24. Each of these problems is known to exist and on each seme data (including 
aerial photographs and wind patterns) is in the public domain. 
Comparable cases exist which have been mors systematically researched and 
made public. How serious the Namibian direct worker and broader 
downwind/stream effects are is not clear. It is unlikely that they are 
negligible but probable that they are containable (but not now contained) 
within limits affected Namibians would accept. But to make any informed 
judgement beyond that requires systematic data development.
25. See, e.g., "Children In Namibia Face Hunger and Starvation", Namibia 
Communications Centre (Box 236, London WC2X OEL), April 1 9 8 6. The Red 
Cross programme also cited therein is an example of a possibly 
objectively useful effort deeply tainted by the official associations of 
its territorial executing agency.
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